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In recent decades, there has been a growing interest in Benedict de Spinoza's political 
philosophy. On the side of intellectual history, Jonathan Israel has identified Spinoza's 
thought as the true foundation of modernity, the origin of a 'radical enlightenment' against 
which the 'moderate enlightenment' of Voltaire and the philosophes defined itself. On the side 
of philosophy, Spinoza scholarship no longer limits itself to Spinoza's metaphysics and 
epistemology, instead increasingly examining the inner logic and conceptual structure of 
Spinoza's political works. Into this context, Mogens Lærke, already a noted scholar of the 
Spinoza-Leibniz encounter, offers his own take on what lies at the core of Spinoza's political 
philosophy: the idea of freedom of philosophizing. 
 
The term 'freedom of philosophizing', libertas philosophandi, is taken from the subtitle to 
Spinoza's better known (and only complete) political work, the Theological-Political Treatise 
(TTP).1 The full title reads: 
Theological-Political Treatise. Several Discussions Showing that the Republic can 
Grant Freedom of Philosophizing Without Harming its Peace or Piety, and Cannot 
Deny It Without Destroying its Peace and Piety. 
Lærke's central objective in his book is to argue that Spinoza is best understood as promoting 
a rich, positive conception of this freedom.2 The foil to Lærke's argument are those 
interpreters who would understand the freedom of philosophising to be nothing other than the 
legal permission of free expression. On Lærke's view, it is undeniable that Spinoza does 
defend the importance of a legal permission for free expression. But he argues that this 
permission is itself a mere licence (licentia), not constitutive of freedom (libertas).3 In 
Spinoza's ethics, individual freedom is understood positively, as rational self-determination; 
so too in Spinoza's politics, freedom of philosophizing will be understood positively, as a 
practice of self-authorized expression, imbued with virtues of honesty and integrity. In one 
sense, this freedom of philosophizing may be weaker than Spinoza's ethical freedom: it does 
not require full rational adequate knowledge. But in another sense it is more demanding. For 
in Lærke's view, while freedom of philosophizing emerges out of citizens' self-appointed 
'authority to teach and advise', this authority can only be exercised interpersonally. This 
makes freedom of philosophizing an essentially collective endeavour, with opinions offered 
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For Lærke, freedom of philosophizing stands as the central organising concept of Spinoza's 
political philosophy. In exploring its hindrances, supports, and broader function, Lærke is 
able to draw together a whole range of other apparently miscellaneous elements of Spinoza's 
political treatises. As to hindrances: legal permission for free expression is important, but it 
can fail to generate free philosophizing, if citizens' judgement is distorted by prejudice, 
deceit, or flattery.5 So what further support does free philosophising require? Lærke offers a 
three-part answer. First, the structures of political counsel need to be reframed. Specifically, 
the old institution of privy counsel to the sovereign, mired in flattery, needs to be replaced by 
an open public sphere.6 Second, the population that will participate in this public sphere 
needs to be educated for civic virtue.7 Lærke argues that an educational program, 
foreshadowed by Spinoza in his later Political Treatise (TP)8 but never written, would have 
rounded off Spinoza's political philosophy, had he lived long enough to carry it out. Third, a 
population requires appropriate imaginative frames to ensure their support for the regime of 
religious and political toleration.9 Lærke groups together Spinoza's doctrines [dogmata] of 
universal faith (articles of minimal civil religion, which Spinoza argues must be believed by 
anyone who in fact conducts themself with justice and charity) along with Spinoza's doctrine 
[dogma] of social contract as serving just such a purpose. Even though God is not a lawgiver, 
even though the social contract is an incoherent fiction, these simple religious and civic 
doctrines frame a population's undertanding in a sociable way, helping to shape them towards 
a properly brotherly engagement with their fellow citizens, regardless of their differences. 
Finally, free philosophizing is understood to serve the broader function of creating a new and 
more democratic form of relationship between political counsel and sovereign command.10 In 
this way, Lærke contributes a new element to Spinoza's growing recognition as an important 
early theorist of democracy and democratization. 
 
There is much to admire in Lærke's book. Through careful work with Spinoza's texts, as well 
as through thorough contextualization of Spinoza within an array of historical sources and 
interlocutors, Lærke effectively makes his case both for his preferred positive interpretation 
of freedom of philosophizing, and for its centrality to Spinoza's political philosophy. Along 
the way, Lærke poses elegant solutions to various enduring puzzles of interpretation, notably 
regarding the status of Spinoza's doctrines of universal faith and regarding his inconsistent 
commitment to social contract explanations. 
 
Nonetheless, I want to raise a friendly challenge to Lærke's interpretation of Spinoza. While 
Lærke is keen to place Spinoza in the republican tradition broadly construed,11 he has not 
foregrounded one of the–to my mind–key republican features of Spinoza's work, namely, the 
central role of all the fine mundane minutiae of institutional design in generating a virtuous 
citizen body. 
 
Lærke emphasizes that true freedom of philosophizing–where citizens share brotherly advice 
with one another, relating to one another with the virtues of integrity and nobility–is a 
significant challenge to achieve.12 For individuals who are legally permitted to philosophize 
 
5 Ibid., 14, 95-120. 
6 Ibid., 14-15, 121-146. 
7 Ibid., 15, 101-4, 147-166. 
8 Benedict de Spinoza (2016), Political Treatise. In The Collected Works of Spinoza, trans. Edwin Curley 
(Volume 2; Princeton: Princeton University Press), 489-604. 
9 Lærke, Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing, 15-16, 167-215. 
10 Ibid., 234-47. 
11 Ibid., 1-5, 126-7. 





freely might nonetheless fail to use this licence appropriately, instead displaying prejudice, 
deceit, and flattery.13 He quotes the Theological-Political Treatise's statement of the essential 
but difficult task of politics: 'to establish the state so that there's no room for fraud.'14 But 
what measures might overcome this challenge? On Lærke's reconstruction, neither law nor 
force offer any assistance. Instead, in his view (as sketched above), Spinoza's solution 
comprises three planks: replace royal courtiers with a public sphere; provide education; and 
inculcate suitable doctrines. 
 
While Lærke structures his book around this challenge, he evinces a lingering discomfort that 
the strict contents of Spinoza's texts are not quite sufficient to answer this challenge. For the 
central plank of Lærke's solution is not really Spinoza's, but a speculative reconstruction: 
Spinoza himself does not have much to say about education in his existing writings. Spinoza 
does make a short remark late in the Political Treatise, in which he promises to take up the 
topic of education in another place (TP 8.49|GIII 346).15 Lærke seizes upon this remark to 
suggest that Spinoza himself took a consideration of education to be the piece needed to 
complete his political philosophy, he only died before he could complete it.16 With this 
licence, Lærke then draws on extensive discussion of education by Spinoza's contemporaries 
to reconstruct how education could have solved the putative gap in Spinoza's theory. 
 
This is ingenious, but I do wonder, whether Lærke has failed to take sufficiently seriously a 
solution that Spinoza actually offers. Recall the critical quote above, framing the challenge 
for politics to be eliminating fraud. The full quote is as follows: 
to establish the state so that there's no room for fraud–to establish things so that 
everyone, whatever his mentality, prefers the public right to private advantage, this is 
the task, this is our concern. (TTP 17.16|GIII 203) 
Spinoza himself then offers a discussion of how the biblical Hebrew Republic met this 
challenge. Their solution was partly doctrinal and educational, but it was more significantly 
and overwhelmingly institutional. Commitment to the common good was achieved through 
the infinite complex details of institutional design: who held office, what was the decision 
procedure, what was the division of responsibilities, what was the guarantee of the people's 
material security (including the jubilee). (TTP 17.26-92|GIII 205-17, especially 17.62|212) 
The state was established such that the actual pressures faced by each party brought about 
public spirited attitudes and actions. 
 
The Hebrew case cannot furnish a direct answer to Lærke's puzzle, because it concerns 
political virtue in a context of enforced doctrinal uniformity. By contrast, we are now 
interested in the virtues appropriate to a free society. However, here also the same 
institutional focus is explicitly maintained, framed in classic republican terms: citizens' 'virtue 
and constant observance of the laws are to be attributed most to the virtue of the 
commonwealth and its absolute right'. The virtue or vice of a population is to be imputed to 
the quality of their commonwealth, and not the other way around. (TP 5.2-3|GIII 295) Lærke 
may be correct that the law narrowly understood, as a command backed by punishment, may 
be of little help to achieve the required virtue.17 But in the republican tradition, law is more 
broadly conceived, encompassing institutional setup in general: all the grey meticulous 
matters of incentives and pressures and money and rules of organisation, which fill the 
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'boring chapters' of the TP (6-11). Law in this broader sense promises to have a 
correspondingly broader impact on citizens' conduct. 
 
Let us see now more specifically how these institutional considerations might offer a solution 
to Lærke's puzzle. Flattery is a grave and corrosive misuse of the permission for free 
expression. Neither flatterer nor the flattered speak with honesty and integrity: the flatterer 
does not speak their own true judgement, and the flattered receives no rational challenge to 
their views. But flattery is not eliminated simply (as Lærke's discussion would suggest) by 
replacing courtiers with a public sphere and by educating the populace. For flattery and the 
subservience that drives it are constantly generated by relations of dependence: the more an 
individual has to gain or lose from another's decision, the less protected they are from the 
other's whims, the more inclined they will be to flattery. Thus, it is no coincidence that 
merchants are the exemplars of free philosophizing in the period:18not only because they are 
separate from the royal court and because they are well educated, but also and more 
importantly because they are economically independent, unlike servants, wage labourers, or 
women. The economic conditions of free philosophizing include eliminating economic 
dependency. Correspondingly, and discomfitingly to the contemporary reader, Spinoza is 
quite happy to summarily exclude economic dependents from the citizen body, notably 
servants (TP 6.11|GIII 300). Political dependence can also produce servile flattery, as for 
instance when certain people hold office for a long time, and govern favourably towards 
those who defer to them. Even in a society with a public sphere of educated citizens, there 
will still be need for aggressive institutional measures to counteract this tendency. The 
concern about dependency renders comprehensible Spinoza's extraordinary system of 
selection and rotation of counsellors to the king in a well-ordered monarchy, which is so 
extensive as to approach a system of lot.19 If political office is achieved through lottery, and 
held only briefly, there is no chance for office holders to accumulate toadies. 
 
Lærke's discussions display some hints of awareness of this dimension of Spinoza's thought,20 
but only inconsistently. For instance, Lærke offers Spinoza's retelling of an anecdote from 
Quintus Curtius as evidence for the claim that people 'will, whenever the slightest 
opportunity arises, exercise their natural authority to teach and advise'.21 But it does not seem 
to me that the anecdote supports his claim. Certainly, citizen-soldiers persistently criticized 
Alexander the Great. But equally, as Spinoza very explicitly notes, mercenary soldiers were 
compliant and servile. (TTP 17.67-8|GIII 213) So again, a key determinant of virtue are the 
conditions of dependency or independence in which people find themselves. 
 
In sum, Lærke is surely correct that Spinoza's best state would cultivate a robust public 
sphere of discussion, put in place a system of education, and disseminate pro-social narratives 
amongst the citizenry, and all these factors may contribute to civic virtue. But Spinoza's 
political philosophy recognizes that there are also larger forces at play. If economic and 
political forces are pressing for subservience, a citizen's education is unlikely efficaciously to 
lead to the virtues of nobility and integrity and the activity of free philosophizing. Lærke 
offers occasional discussion of these themes, but I wonder whether they deserve to be given 
more central place, reflecting their central place in Spinoza's own later writings. Without 
doubt, Lærke has performed excellent service in delineating the new participatory democratic 
 
18 Ibid., 143-4. 
19 Sandra Leonie Field (2020), Potentia: Hobbes and Spinoza on Power and Popular Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 254-6. 
20 Lærke, Spinoza and the Freedom of Philosophizing, 117, 130, 143. 





public sphere which connects throughout Spinoza's political texts. But this sphere of free 
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and received amongst equals, who seek truth through friendly mutual teaching and 
interchange.4 
 
For Lærke, freedom of philosophizing stands as the central organising concept of Spinoza's 
political philosophy. In exploring its hindrances, supports, and broader function, Lærke is 
able to draw together a whole range of other apparently miscellaneous elements of Spinoza's 
political treatises. As to hindrances: legal permission for free expression is important, but it 
can fail to generate free philosophizing, if citizens' judgement is distorted by prejudice, 
deceit, or flattery.5 So what further support does free philosophising require? Lærke offers a 
three-part answer. First, the structures of political counsel need to be reframed. Specifically, 
the old institution of privy counsel to the sovereign, mired in flattery, needs to be replaced by 
an open public sphere.6 Second, the population that will participate in this public sphere 
needs to be educated for civic virtue.7 Lærke argues that an educational program, 
foreshadowed by Spinoza in his later Political Treatise (TP)8 but never written, would have 
rounded off Spinoza's political philosophy, had he lived long enough to carry it out. Third, a 
population requires appropriate imaginative frames to ensure their support for the regime of 
religious and political toleration.9 Lærke groups together Spinoza's doctrines [dogmata] of 
universal faith (articles of minimal civil religion, which Spinoza argues must be believed by 
anyone who in fact conducts themself with justice and charity) along with Spinoza's doctrine 
[dogma] of social contract as serving just such a purpose. Even though God is not a lawgiver, 
even though the social contract is an incoherent fiction, these simple religious and civic 
doctrines frame a population's undertanding in a sociable way, helping to shape them towards 
a properly brotherly engagement with their fellow citizens, regardless of their differences. 
Finally, free philosophizing is understood to serve the broader function of creating a new and 
more democratic form of relationship between political counsel and sovereign command.10 In 
this way, Lærke contributes a new element to Spinoza's growing recognition as an important 
early theorist of democracy and democratization. 
 
There is much to admire in Lærke's book. Through careful work with Spinoza's texts, as well 
as through thorough contextualization of Spinoza within an array of historical sources and 
interlocutors, Lærke effectively makes his case both for his preferred positive interpretation 
of freedom of philosophizing, and for its centrality to Spinoza's political philosophy. Along 
the way, Lærke poses elegant solutions to various enduring puzzles of interpretation, notably 
regarding the status of Spinoza's doctrines of universal faith and regarding his inconsistent 
commitment to social contract explanations. 
 
Nonetheless, I want to raise a friendly challenge to Lærke's interpretation of Spinoza. While 
Lærke is keen to place Spinoza in the republican tradition broadly construed,11 he has not 
foregrounded one of the–to my mind–key republican features of Spinoza's work, namely, the 
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Lærke emphasizes that true freedom of philosophizing–where citizens share brotherly advice 
with one another, relating to one another with the virtues of integrity and nobility–is a 
significant challenge to achieve.12 For individuals who are legally permitted to philosophize 
freely might nonetheless fail to use this licence appropriately, instead displaying prejudice, 
deceit, and flattery.13 He quotes the Theological-Political Treatise's statement of the essential 
but difficult task of politics: 'to establish the state so that there's no room for fraud.'14 But 
what measures might overcome this challenge? On Lærke's reconstruction, neither law nor 
force offer any assistance. Instead, in his view (as sketched above), Spinoza's solution 
comprises three planks: replace royal courtiers with a public sphere; provide education; and 
inculcate suitable doctrines. 
 
While Lærke structures his book around this challenge, he evinces a lingering discomfort that 
the strict contents of Spinoza's texts are not quite sufficient to answer this challenge. For the 
central plank of Lærke's solution is not really Spinoza's, but a speculative reconstruction: 
Spinoza himself does not have much to say about education in his existing writings. Spinoza 
does make a short remark late in the Political Treatise, in which he promises to take up the 
topic of education in another place (TP 8.49|GIII 346).15 Lærke seizes upon this remark to 
suggest that Spinoza himself took a consideration of education to be the piece needed to 
complete his political philosophy, he only died before he could complete it.16 With this 
licence, Lærke then draws on extensive discussion of education by Spinoza's contemporaries 
to reconstruct how education could have solved the putative gap in Spinoza's theory. 
 
This is ingenious, but I do wonder, whether Lærke has failed to take sufficiently seriously a 
solution that Spinoza actually offers. Recall the critical quote above, framing the challenge 
for politics to be eliminating fraud. The full quote is as follows: 
to establish the state so that there's no room for fraud–to establish things so that 
everyone, whatever his mentality, prefers the public right to private advantage, this is 
the task, this is our concern. (TTP 17.16|GIII 203) 
Spinoza himself then offers a discussion of how the biblical Hebrew Republic met this 
challenge. Their solution was partly doctrinal and educational, but it was more significantly 
and overwhelmingly institutional. Commitment to the common good was achieved through 
the infinite complex details of institutional design: who held office, what was the decision 
procedure, what was the division of responsibilities, what was the guarantee of the people's 
material security (including the jubilee). (TTP 17.26-92|GIII 205-17, especially 17.62|212) 
The state was established such that the actual pressures faced by each party brought about 
public spirited attitudes and actions. 
 
The Hebrew case cannot furnish a direct answer to Lærke's puzzle, because it concerns 
political virtue in a context of enforced doctrinal uniformity. By contrast, we are now 
interested in the virtues appropriate to a free society. However, here also the same 
institutional focus is explicitly maintained, framed in classic republican terms: citizens' 'virtue 
and constant observance of the laws are to be attributed most to the virtue of the 
commonwealth and its absolute right'. The virtue or vice of a population is to be imputed to 
the quality of their commonwealth, and not the other way around. (TP 5.2-3|GIII 295) Lærke 
may be correct that the law narrowly understood, as a command backed by punishment, may 
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be of little help to achieve the required virtue.17 But in the republican tradition, law is more 
broadly conceived, encompassing institutional setup in general: all the grey meticulous 
matters of incentives and pressures and money and rules of organisation, which fill the 
'boring chapters' of the TP (6-11). Law in this broader sense promises to have a 
correspondingly broader impact on citizens' conduct. For vices such as flattery and servility 
find their root in relations of dependence, but the degree of dependence between citizens is 
largely determined by the institutional structures within which they live. 
 
Lærke is surely correct that Spinoza's best state would cultivate a robust public sphere of 
discussion, put in place a system of education, and disseminate pro-social narratives amongst 
the citizenry, and all these factors may contribute to civic virtue. But Spinoza's political 
philosophy recognizes that there are also larger forces at play. If economic and political 
forces are pressing for subservience, a citizen's education is unlikely efficaciously to lead to 
the virtues of nobility and integrity and the activity of free philosophizing. Lærke offers 
occasional discussion of these themes, but I wonder whether they deserve to be given more 
central place, reflecting their central place in Spinoza's own later writings. Without doubt, 
Lærke has performed excellent service in delineating the new participatory democratic public 
sphere which connects throughout Spinoza's political texts. But this sphere of free 
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